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The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia - Implementation Force (IFOR) and the
Stabilization Force (SFOR), or collectively (IFOR/SFOR) - exemplify the new opportunities,
and prerequisites, for multinational peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. These operations
have shown that regional organizations and the UN can complement rather than complicate
each other's work.
The operations also demonstrate that with the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United
States have been able to cooperate in a new fashion, widening the potential scope for
peacekeeping in the future. The key prerequisite for success in Bosnia (and for the future) is
the willingness of the peacekeeping partners to compromise on their near-term interests and
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The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia - Implementation Force (IFOR) and the
Stabilization Force (SFOR), or collectively (IFOR/SFOR) - exemplify the new opportunities,
and prerequisites, for multinational peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. These operations
have shown that regional organizations and the UN can complement rather than complicate
each other's work. The operations also demonstrate that with the end of the Cold War, Russia
and the United States have been able to cooperate in a new fashion, widening the potential
scope for peacekeeping in the future. The key prerequisite for success in Bosnia (and for the
future) is the willingness of the peacekeeping partners to compromise on their near-term
interests, and focus on the long-term benefits of peace and cooperation.
IFOR's achievements were significant. It separated the opposing forces, supervised
exchanges of territory, enforced the cease fire, demobilized armies and heavy weapons and
created a secure environment for political and economic recovery. The stabilization force
continues these missions.
IFOR/SFOR also is important because it constitutes the first case of cooperation between
the Russian and US military. Russia and NATO demonstrated considerable flexibility and
compromise while the coalition was forming, particularly in chain of command issues. Close
cooperation between the Russian and US politicians and military was one of the crucial
preconditions of success in Bosnia.
IFOR/SFOR might be considered as a model of future peace operations. They should not
replace traditional UN peacekeeping activities, but complement those activities where it is
necessary to go beyond traditional peacekeeping. The IFOR/SFOR model suggests that in
order to achieve the necessary cooperation by participants in the operation, they will have to
adjust their assessments of their national interests, and (in some cases) compromise on
principles. In any case, the Bosnian experience has facilitated mutual understanding between
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While Peace Operations (POs) help maintain global and regional security and
stability, they have always been a function of concrete national interests. With the end of
the Cold War, the nature and scope of POs have changed dramatically. Now that the
ideological rivalry that ruled the US and Russian national interests in the past has gone,
POs are in the process of reforming and acquiring new purposes, and are subject to new
constraints. However, a general analysis of past POs shows that international
organizations were able to effectively engage and manage conflicts when there was a
consent on crucial questions based on combinations of national interests, and, more
specifically, when there was a will of one of the superpowers "to swallow its principles". 1
New trends in peace operations. Recent developments have revealed that
traditional UN peacekeeping was not always an adequate response to some contingencies,
although it showed limited effectiveness in many cases.2 On several occasions, the
1 This precondition was articulated and proved by Ernst Haas in his outstanding research of more than
300 conflicts. - See Haas, Ernst B. The United Nations and Collective Management of International
Conflict. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1986, p. 39. - Since then the
world has changed greatly, it is becoming multipolar and more complex with a greater number of various
interactions that will require a lot of compromise between different poles of the world.
2
It is quite clear, that the ultimate criterion of effectiveness is a full-scale settlement of a conflict.
However, it is not always practically achievable, that is why the UN Mandate may include different tasks:
control a cease of fire; abate a situation; isolate a conflict. These tasks implementation may be assessed
using different criteria of effectiveness. For example, according to Ernst Haas's study of 319 conflicts in
1945-1984, the UN peacekeeping had showed a substantial, although limited success in terms of isolation
and abatement. However, fewer and fewer of the more serious disputes were referred to the UN and
regional organizations for management, particularly since late 1970s. That is why Haas concluded in
general that there was a decline in effectiveness for the United Nations and the regional organizations. -
See Haas, Ernst B. The United Nations and Collective Management ofInternational Conflict.
Security Council has authorized Member States to use 'all necessary means" - including
force - to deal with armed conflict or threats to peace. Acting with such authorization,
Member States formed military coalitions in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and in
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997, the Council authorized
similar action by a "coalition of the willing" to deal with the situation in Albania.
However, none of these enforcement operations were under UN control, but were instead
directed by a single country or a group of countries. Not all of these operations were
successful.
In recent years UN peacekeeping activity has greatly enbrged compared with
traditional peacekeeping activities of 1945-85. In the last ten years the UN has conducted
more operations than in the preceding forty years. This enlargement has been not only
quantitative, but qualitative. Modern UN POs are aimed at performing new tasks, and
often go far beyond traditional peacekeeping. They may include different types of
humanitarian interventions (delivery of provisions and cargoes, relief to victims of
hostilities and refugees), imposing and conducting of embargo, demining, restraining and
disarming warring parties. Many UN POs also include various civil functions: elections
and human rights monitoring, humanitarian assistance, administrative management, and
the rebuilding of administrative systems and infrastructure.
Why Bosnia is a good example? The POs in Bosnia - the UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) - is a good
example of post-Cold War efforts to resolve serious conflicts. They show the limits and
capabilities of the world community, and the role of regional alliances in international
conflict management. They also represent one of the most interesting cases of so called
'second generation operations". First, they have shown that regional organizations and the
UN can complement rather than complicate each other's work. Second, LFOR/SFOR has
been coalitional operation that represented common interests (settlement of a conflict that
was jeopardizing European peace and security) even though it required one of the
coalition members (Russia) to Swallow its principles" 3 . Third, it has involved the joint
efforts of the prior Cold War enemies ~ the US and Russia4
,
and showed the new level of
US and Russia's cooperation in peace support. Fourth, to date it has been the most
successful and the least bloody peace operation despite being conducted under a mandate
providing for the use of full-scale force measures to fulfill the achieved agreements.
One of the purposes of this thesis is to understand why UNPROFOR failed and
IFOR/SFOR succeeded to stop hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. Another purpose is to
analyze whether the NATO-led PO in Bosnia is a model that can be applied to future
conflict management, or an exception that reflects a unique combination of circumstances.
This problem is important now, because the international community has acquired
new and more effective means to prevent crises and settle conflicts. New conditions also
* Russia's principles include its historically determined orientation to the Serbs, while considering the
Balkans as one of Russia's traditional spheres of influence. Now this influence has obviously substantially
diminished. At the same time participation of Russian troops in the Bosnian operation has allowed Russia
to preserve some influence in this region and to some extent guarantee its historical ties with the Serbs.
4 Here Russia means the USSR that actually was the US enemy.
exist for Russia and the US to cooperate in promoting global peace and security, including
enhanced military cooperation. The peace operation in Bosnia is an example of effectively
coordinated efforts provided by multinational combined capabilities.
The Bosnian case and UNPROFOR example illustrate that peacekeepers cannot do
their job if there is no peace to keep. It also shows that urgent intervention is sometimes
necessary at the very height of conflict, even if only to prevent hostilities from spreading.
However, there must be created or exist certain preconditions for such operation to be
successful.
The IFOR/SFOR example shows, how these preconditions were created. The
decision to intervene was well prepared, and general consensus of all powers was
achieved. The employment of effective mixed strategy resulted in the warring parties'
consent to more robust force deployment. The conflict had come to a stalemate, and the
parties understood their inability to solve it by military force. A clear military strategy was
developed, and public support was gained. In short, the appropriate insertion of a regional
task force at the right time to ensure the cease-fire was held and a stable environment was
created for the post conflict peace building phase. At the same time, the PO in Bosnia still
has not addressed the problems underlying the conflict, which makes the operational
success a temporary one, and requires the presence of some foreign peacekeepers,
international organizations, and aid workers.
The Bosnian experience has revealed two important issues. First is that Russia can
and should contribute to maintaining global and regional peace and stability. Second is that
Russia can and should cooperate with US and NATO in all global and regional issues.
Some people say that Russia 'betrayed" its national interests in Bosnia. However, it were
not national interests, but some principles that were eventually "swallowed" and
modified for the sake of peace in the Balkans. 5
IFOR/SFOR might be considered as a model of future peace operations. They
should not replace traditional UN peacekeeping activities, but complement it where it is
necessary to go beyond traditional peacekeeping. The IFOR/SFOR model suggests that in
order to achieve the necessary cooperation by participants in the operation, they will have
to adjust their assessments of their national interests, and (in some cases) compromise on
principles. In any case, the Bosnian experience has facilitated mutual understanding
between Russia and the United States, and laid a solid basis for future cooperation in the
future.
This thesis consists of six chapters and general conclusions. Chapter I deals with a
historical review and new developments in Peace Operations in the post-Cold War era.
Chapter II, gives some theoretical provisions and hypotheses. Chapter III analyzes history
of and international response to Yugoslav crisis. Chapter IV explores UNPROFOR's
failures and achievements. Chapter V gives assessment of IFOR/SFOR. Chapter VI deals
with comparative analysis of the POs in Bosnia and the lessons learned.
' There is a great difference between national interests and principles. While national interests are
objectively existing national goals, principles are these goals, understood subjectively. History shows that
these two categories are very often confused in real politics and policy, when principles are taken for
interests and vice versa. Probably, this confusion of principles and interests led to WW I - actually there
were more of principles than interests involved in Serbia then. Russia now is not a superpower in terms of
the former USSR, however, the past historical memories and its present geopolitical weight still do not
make it easy for that country to swallow its principles, and extremely agitate the Russian public opinion.

I. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS
The end of the Cold War provides a sharp dividing line between two periods in the
UN peacekeeping history: 1945-1988 and 1989-present. Before that there have been 13
UN peacekeeping operations. Thirty peacekeeping operations were created by the
Security Council between 1988 and 1997. There currently 17 POs underway, involving
some 23,000 peacekeepers. 6
As the result of such a heavy involvement in world affairs, the UN has been carried
away by a peacekeeping euphoria, while becoming more and more overstretched by new
and rather difficult missions.
A. PEACE OPERATIONS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW
1. Traditional Peacekeeping
During 1945-1985 there were three broad categories of the UN military tasks7 :
• observer missions;
• peacekeeping missions; and
• enforcement measures designed to restrain an identified aggressor.
° See United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance. UN DPI, May 1997.
' Haas, Ernst B. The United Nations and Collective Management ofInternational Conflict. New York:
United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1986; Zacher, Mark W. International Conflicts and
Collective Security, 1946-77. NY: Praeger, 1979; Finlayson, Jock A., Zacher, Mark W. "The United
Nations and Collective Security", in: The United States, the United Nations and the Management of
Global Change, ed. by Tobi Trister Gati. NY: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. 162-183; Mackinlay,
John. Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping. In: Military Implications Of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations. Ed. by William H. Lewis. National Defense University. The Institute For
National Strategic Studies: Mcnair Paper, 1993. Pp. 25-28.
The last happened, for example, during the Korean War. Military enforcement also
occurred during the Congo operation, as an unplanned outgrowth of a peacekeeping
mission. The UN forces achieved a complete victory and the defeated party lacked
sovereign status.
In general, in 1945-1985 the UN had maintained a significant role and authority in
conflict settlement compared to rather low impacts of regional organizations. During the
period of 1945-1985 the UN had showed substantial success in abating and isolating
disputes, and limited effectiveness in achieving full-scale settlement.
When conditions relating to leadership, consensus, alignment and issue salience
were in congruence, successful peacekeeping could take place even if the procedures for
organizing, staffing and paying for the operation remained fluid. A peacekeeping operation
was normally regarded as a success if it could create conditions of stability and trust to
facilitate eventual settlement. The cases of attempted enforcement suggest that action
outside the UN framework was crucial to success. Permanent settlement came about when
the superpowers, through unilateral means, put pressure on the stronger party to give way.
Neutrality was not always required for success. Moreover, UN military operations were
most often successful when they favored one side in a dispute. 8
In general, international organizations' efficiency depended on the presence of a
sufficient consensus about combination of national interests. But even if such a consensus
was lacking, permissive engagement remained possible if and when one of the
o
° See Haas, Ernst B. The United Nations and Collective Management ofInternational Conflict.
superpowers was willing to swallow its principles and make the necessary voluntary
contribution to a peacekeeping operation.
During 1945-1985 some principles of interpositional peacekeeping emerged,
including:
• the need for support by the mandating authority, the Security Council;
• the requirement that the operation be deployed only with the consent of the
warring parties;
• the command and control of the Force by the UN;
• the special composition of the Force; and
• the restriction that force be used only in self-defense.
2. Constraints of Traditional Peacekeeping
First doubts about the UN's effectiveness appeared in late 1970s and early 1980s.
This period was characterized by the significant growth of non-referred serious conflicts
that showed a trend toward disillusionment with the abilities of the international
community to effectively settle armed disputes. Warring parties were more and more
prone to tolerate than regulate a conflict.
After initial euphoria of early 1990s and Somalian and Yugoslav debacles the
concept of peacekeeping as a multipurpose conflict resolution device has been considered
as already overextended and unable to meet the dynamic contingencies of the future.
According to some analysts, in reality the UN peacekeepers have, with mixed results,
already crossed the threshold of traditional peacekeeping operations into a new range of
second generation tasks9 .
The main constraints of traditionalpeacekeeping have been asfollows:
1. A divided Security Council resulted in mandates which were sometimes based
on a minimal area of common agreement, restrictive in scope and vaguely expressed.
Often, following the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, no further adjustments
could be made to the mandate and this reduced its effectiveness and credibility in the field
and gave the appearance of weakness. As a result the peacekeepers' operational flexibility
was reduced, which limited their ability to adapt their role to the needs of a changing
situation.
2. Peacekeepers' impartiality in the Cold War missions was based on the mutually
agreed disinterest of the Security Council. However, this disinterest often caused UN
officials' passive response, and removed from the UN missions the operational flexibility
needed to meet changing situations with an effective military presence in the field.
3
.
UN peacekeeping forces tended to operate only with the full cooperation of the
parties concerned. Peacekeepers did not have the military means to enforce a mandate
from the Security Council. The consent and cooperation of the interested parties was
therefore essential for success. This meant that a Force could only be deployed once the
conflict began to stalemate or stabilize and a political will prevailed between the parties to
See Mackinlay, John. Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping.
10
seek an alternative to violence. Peacekeepers could not operate successfully until these
conditions were met.
4. A Peacekeeping Force normally operated under the command of the United
Nations, and under the authority of the Security Council. Command in the field was
exercised by a Force Commander appointed by and responsible to the Secretary-General.
That sometimes made the chain of command ineffective.
5. According to the accepted principle of "equitable geographic representation",
peacekeepers were drawn from middle level or small powers, some with only a limited
military capability. The constrained and reactive tasks of peacekeeping did not demand
more than this. In principle, nations with small, undeveloped military forces could,
without threatening the parties involved, provide infantry units, while nations with more
sophisticated military powers provided the support units.
6. Peacekeepers were not allowed to use force except in self-defense. The rules of
engagement also tended to vary from Force to Force and in some Forces, particularly in
the early phase of deployment, varied between contingents. Once deployed, the UN
peacekeepers tended to report on, but not intervene in, violent incidents or violations of
peace agreements. Escalating the response beyond the use of force in self-defense was
regarded as enforcement. Without the power or authority to take problem-solving action,
except at a very local level, peacekeepers had to rely more on their symbolic international
presence and the moral pressures arising from the disapproval of the international
community.
11
7. There was never much pressure on the UN planning staff to develop the
capability to deploy or conduct an effective military operation. Although Force
Commanders and individual staff officers published critical accounts of planning failures,
particularly in the initial phases of deployment, there was no institutional process to learn
these lessons and the same problems and mistakes occurred again at the initial phase of
new forces. The strongest reason not to improve the system was the feeling in New York
that, notwithstanding their short term discomforts and lack of effectiveness, the UN
military presence was marginal to the success of the process. 10
8. According to the UN official view, there have been two major problems that
thwarted some recent peacekeeping missions. The principal problem has been the
unwillingness of warring parties to seek peaceful solutions. Another major problem has
been member states' failure to provide sufficient resources. Peacekeepers have been
handed daunting tasks by the Security Council - but have not been given the means to
carry them out.
For example, in 1994 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that
peacekeeping commander would need 35,000 troops to deter attacks on the 'fcafe areas"
in Bosnia and Herzegovina created by the Security Council. Member states authorized
7,600 troops and took a year to provide them. 11
10 See Mackinlay, John. Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping. - The situation has radically changed
now, when the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has established a Lessons Learned unit to
capture lessons from PKOs and share them with future PKOs.
1
1
See United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance. UN DPI, May 1997.
12
In Rwanda in 1994, faced with evidence of genocide, the UN Security Council
(UNSC) unanimously decided that 5,500 peacekeepers were urgently needed. But it took
nearly six months for member states to provide the troops, even though 19 governments
had pledged to keep 3 1,000 troops on a stand-by basis for UN peacekeeping. 12
B. THENEWREQUIREMENTS TO PEACE OPERATIONS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
1. The distinctive features of the post-Cold War era
Post-Cold War era is characterized by a number of new features.
First, there is an obvious change of dominant issues. Global changes have
generated a new range of conflict. In addition to regional conflict, multi-ethnic states
began to disintegrate, and internal rather than inter-state conflicts proliferated.
Humanitarian emergencies worsened and fragile governments emerged to fill the vacuum
created by superpower withdrawals.
The decisions of the UN have become more forceful based on a stronger
consensus. The end of the Cold War removed some of the political tensions in the UN that
had limited the scope and application of peacekeeping. No longer subject to superpower
confrontation and competition, the Security Council has become increasingly effective
with an enhanced ability to negotiate peace agreements in long-standing conflict zones.




over time and with more success. Peace forces were deployed with more explicit and
firmly stated mandates than in the past.
The range of UN tasks had, de facto, been extended beyond the recognized
limitations of "peacekeeping." In addition to the traditional roles of conventional observer
missions and peacekeeping, UN forces were now involved in more complicated
operations: supervising cease-fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance
of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the denial of an air
space and the guarantee of rights of passage. In many of these operations local factions
tended to resist the presence of UN troops as in Somalia, Bosnia and, to some extent,
Cambodia.
This led to a conclusion that some kinds of disputes still cannot be handled
effectively with military operations launched by international organizations with a
traditional peacekeeping orientation.
Under these circumstances the concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but
rigid form of the traditional prototype should undergo certain changes to adapt to the new
conditions. An emerging era of international restructuring has brought with it a new range
of operational tasks for the UN (Second generation tasks'). These are distinct from
peacekeeping because UN forces do not necessarily enjoy the support of all the parties
involved, and consequently will have to take much more rigorous steps to ensure their
personnel safety and achieve the conditions required in the mandate. In some second
14
generation tasks, authorized under an enforcement mandate, heavy weapons systems
including armored vehicles, combat aircraft, and warships may be deployed.
SUMMARY
Although the UN peacekeeping missions have been effective on the whole, they
often did not meet the warring parties' demands, and thus more tended to 'freeze" rather
than solve the problem. That is why in many cases, especially in armed conflicts, parties
preferred to manage a dispute without referring to the UN or regional organizations.
Countries preferred to stay outside the conflict unless it had touched certain sensitive
points of national interests.
Under the new global changes traditional peacekeeping missions have developed to
a new type of peace operations - 'Second generation tasks". They fall between the
techniques of peacekeepers and observers, and enforcement, and require more robust




Peace operations comprise a large spectrum of operations that the UN might
undertake to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of its Charter in the
face of a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." 13
.
A. FUNDAMENTALS OFPEACE OPERATIONS
1. New Classification of Peace Operations
Here we mostly stick to the classification framework proposed by William
Durch. 14 These operations can be classified according to the level of local consent (as a
working definition, we take "consent" to mean the agreement of a host government to a
UN mission's presence 15 ), level of coercion (military force), and complexity of
objectives. We assume that all these levels vary from zero to one.
The level of local consent. Most UN operations are undertaken with full local
consent. In a multiparty conflict, however, some parties consent can be hard to maintain.
Some factions within the host country, including armed elements, may object to that
13 UN Charter, Chapter VII. Web Site Electronic Version.
14 The Evolution ofUN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. Ed. by William Durch.
Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY.: St. Martin Press. 1993; Durch W.J. Keeping the
Peace: Politics and Lessons ofthe 1990s. In: UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars
of the 1990s. /Ed. Durch W.J. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY: St. Martin's Press.
1996.
15 The Evolution ofUN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. Ed. by William Durch.
Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY.: St. Martin Press. 1993. p. 5.
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presence, and on occasion peacekeepers may need to use force as a last resort to defend
themselves or restore order to a deteriorating field situation. This possibility can be
observed from the example of the UN's 1960-64 operation in the Congo.
The level of military force. It can range from no force (as in mediation and
preventive diplomacy) to a full-scale enforcement (for a peace enforcement action like the
1991 Gulf War).
The level of complexity may vary from one-objective missions (most traditional
peacekeeping operations were normally focused on maintaining a cease-fire) through
multi-purpose operations that involve many tasks (like the operation in Cambodia that was
undertaken to prevent further clashes, create stable conditions and conduct elections) to
peace enforcement that uses military force to stop hostilities, divide parties and create
conditions for further agreements (IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia).
Peace operations according to these levels may be classified as peacekeeping,
multidimensional operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention.
Traditional peacekeeping involves full local consent, single mission objectives and
practically no use of force.
Multidimensional operations also involve nominally full consent, but their
mandates tend to be much more complex than a traditional operation and they may
encounter reduced levels of acceptance on the part of some local factions that may entail a
restricted application of force.
Peace enforcement operations may have the consent of one party in a conflict, or
one or more factions in a civil war, but they may also be directed against all combatants
18
equally; that is, they may operate without local belligerent consent The complexity of
peace enforcement operations and the force involved may also vary a great deal, from
relatively straightforward operations to resist or suppress minor cross-border aggression
to all-azimuth conflict suppression followed by the rebuilding of shattered governance.
Humanitarian intervention may vary considerably over time and in scale of
operational complexity, level of consent, and force. The distribution of humanitarian relief
must be accurately calculated because it may erode local consent and increase complexity,
which entails more forceful measures and leads to a 'slippery-slope" from humanitarian
intervention to peace enforcement. 16
Table 1 below presents our empirically assessed values at scale from through 1
related to different PO's types with regard to different levels of their background features.
Table 1. Empirically Assessed Values of Peace Operations' Background
Features Related to Peace Operations Types
PO Types/ Features Consent Complexity Force








1" See The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, pp. 4-7. About
probable "mission creep" during humanitarian intervention see also Durch W.J. Keeping the Peace:
Politics and Lessons ofthe 1990s, pp. 4-6.
17 Here the term "force" refers not so much to force structure of peacekeepers, but to use of force in terms
of enforcement action - peacekeepers normally are not allowed to use force to implement UNSC
resolutions, that is why it is "zero force" for them in the table. At the same time, most UN Peacekeeping
Operations have a military component for self protection, troop cantonment, and demobilization. The
current missions in Africa, MONUA & MTNURSO, are traditional CHVI Peacekeeping Operations, but
each has at least an armed battalion to monitor the cease-fire and compliance with the appropriate
protocols.
19
The four types of peace operations may be compared and contrasted as
represented in chart 1
.
Chart 1. A Three-Dimensional Representation of Peace Operations
Peace operations may be also classified according to the stage of conflict and
level of violence.
Stages of conflict include peace, crisis, war, cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
Levels of violence include low political tension, high political tension, low-level
conflict and intense conflict.
According to these levels peace operations can vary at a larger scale and besides
four types mentioned above include also preventive diplomacy and preventive
deployment.
20
Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties,
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the
latter when they occur. Normally is applied at the early stages of conflict when there is a
sufficiently low level of violence.
Preventive ("deterrent") deployments include actions that would be intended to
deter aggression by signaling the international community's willingness to counter it
militarily. The UN would deploy with the consent of the threatened party but with
capabilities (and orders) to engage in combat as may be necessary. This task distinguishes
such preventive combat deployments from peacekeeping. At the same time, any
peacekeeping operation which is deployed to prevent hostilities from spreading may also
be considered as a preventive deployment.
2. Comparison of Peace Operations
Different types of peace operations relate to different conflicts and conflict stages.
Table 2 shows the relationship between the various types of peace operations according to
the stage and intensity of conflict.
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Preventive diplomacy makes an effort to defuse political tensions before they erupt
into warfare. If it appears that rising tensions might be tempered by the presence of
international forces, then the UN or other suitable regional organizations might resort to a
preventive deployment. If hostilities bring a growing burden on the population a
humanitarian intervention may be mounted to ease that burden. However, it might be
effective only when the level of violence does not exceed a low-level conflict. The
outbreak of war might occasion a peace enforcement operation to suppress conflict; at the
same time a humanitarian intervention may also be conducted. In both cases, the
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international force may be intervening in the midst of ongoing combat, which makes their
task much more difficult, countries contributing their troops harder to find, and unified
command and control harder to achieve and maintain. Traditional peacekeeping (PKO)
and multidimensional operations (MDO) normally deploy after peace has been achieved,
but the area may still face more or less serious outbreak of fighting. Where that probability
is thought especially high, or where any substantial outbreak of violence might shatter a
fragile peace accord, the international operation may be configured for a mixed
multidimensional operation and peace enforcement in an effort to deter such outbreaks, as
was IFOR and is SFOR now in Bosnia.
The graphical presentation of the relationship between the types of peace
operations, stage and intensity of conflict can be seen from the Charts 2 and 3.
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Chart 2. Various Types of Peace Operations According to the Intensity of Conflict
Types of Peace Operations
To date, however, with the exception of the Korean War, which was under de
facto American control, UN operations have all been intercessions after the fact.
Operation Desert Storm was not under UN command, either technically or legally, though
it occurred under UN resolutions. During the Cold War, UN efforts to terminate conflicts
at an early stage were confined to diplomatic initiatives and occasional economic
sanctions. On relatively rare occasions, cease-fires imposed by threats of Great Power
military intervention were later overseen by UN peacekeepers. These were most effective
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where the United States and the Soviet Union wielded great influence with the opposing
sides, and both worked to smother the fighting. The best example is the 1973 Middle East
War.
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Types of Peace Operations
3. Preconditions of Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement
It is a matter of primary importance to clarify the relationship between
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, because every type requires specific preparatory
work to gain sufficient public support. Marrack Goulding, UN Under-Secretary General
for Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping in terms of what has worked
historically, and what distinguishes it from other activities using military personnel.
Peacekeeping is an operation that 'requires the consent of the parties", does 'hot involve
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military enforcement measures", but does Involve the deployment in the field of UN
personnel... to help control and resolve actual or potential international conflicts or...
internal conflicts which have a clear international dimension" 18 .
As for Peace Enforcement, according to the UN's official point of view, in the case
of enforcement action, the UNSC gives member states the authority to take all necessary
measures to achieve a stated objective. Consent of the parties is not necessarily required. 19
By comparison to peacekeeping, enforcement actions impose much higher human
and monetary costs on the countries who take an active role in them. Peace enforcement
are more coercive means of enforcing collective security. The UN Charter specifies that
enforcement actions should be measures of last resort, and to date that is what they have
been. According to UN official information, it has been used in very few cases - in the
Korean conflict in 1950, and, in the 1990s, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, in
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania.20 These interventions,
although endorsed by the Security Council, were directed by a single country or a group
of countries. However, at least in three cases from this list (Korea, Iraq and Somalia)
enforcement operations had very negative implications for the UN forces, warring parties
and civilian population in terms of casualties.
18 The Evolving Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In: The Singapore Symposium, The
Changing Role ofthe United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, United Nations Document
DPI/1141. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, September 1991, p. 25.
19 See United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance. UN DPI, May 1997.
20 See United Nations. Peacekeeping at a Glance. UN DPI, New York, May 1997.
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In this regard it seems important to consider the conditions of successful third-
party intervention in conflicts. Research in this field suggests the following conclusions:
1. On the whole, the success of intervention is determined by geostrategical factors
and particularly by the combination of national interests pursued21 .
2. To achieve the desired goals of intervention, policy makers should focus on how
they intervene, rather than when or where.
3. A mixed strategy employing as many pressure points as possible is most
effective.
4. Intervention is most likely to succeed if it is on behalf of the official state
government.22
5. War weariness and a stalemate are the important factors in determining the
outcome of conflict because they make earlier settlement more attractive. 23
6. The variety of political, economic, and social factors often depicted as causes of
conflicts may have little to do with determining their outcome, and the parties may agree
to some status quo appeared in the course of fighting.24
21 Freedman L. Ibid., p. 5.
22 See Regan P.M. Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, v.40, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 336-359. Analysis spans 50 years and 85 civil conflicts
involving a total of 196 separate interventions.
23 See Mason D.T., Fett P.J. How Civil Wars End. Journal ofConflict Resolution, v.40, No.4, December





According to the theoretical assumptions, described above, we can formulate the
following basic hypotheses concerning the peace operation in Bosnia.
Hypothesis J. Peace operation in Bosnia initially was a traditional peacekeeping
mission (UNPROFOR) conducted in the situation that required coercive measures. That is
why later it was replaced by a multidimensional operation with some elements of peace
enforcement (IFOR/SFOR).
Hypothesis 2. The external factors that have determined the success of NATO-led
peace operation in Bosnia include a specific combination of national interests in Central
and Eastern Europe, the employment of effective mixed strategy, the appeal of the official
Bosnian government for the EFOR deployment, and the will of warring parties to
compromise.
Hypothesis 3. The success of IFOR was determined by a number of internal
factors, including war weariness and military stalemate; consent of all the parties to
international intervention and to the status quo appeared before IFOR started.
Hypothesis 4. The IFOR (SFOR) is a prototype of a new international
community's response to the new challenges of the modern world and represents that
community's desire to more effectively settle the most dangerous and bloody conflicts.
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SUMMARY
Recent developments in international contingencies have set forward new require-
ments for peace operations that exceed the framework of traditional peacekeeping. Peace-
keeping operations have been complemented by preventive diplomacy, preventive
deployment, multidimensional operations, humanitarian interventions and peace enforce-
ment. Enforcement and humanitarian assistance may be the most costly operations
requiring more robust forces and more risks.
The main factors that determine the PO's success may include a general consensus
on relevant national interests; the consent of warring parties, or at least of a host
government, to the PO and to peace force composition; a combination of mixed strategy
and peace force structure and strength; the degree of perceiving war weariness and
conflict stalemate; a change in warring parties goals or in conflict situation that modifies
these goals and makes a compromise possible.
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m. CIVIL WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA: CAUSES,
CHRONOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE
The past is always present in the Balkans and defines the future. Centuries of
history and myths shape daily events in the Balkans. Yugoslavia's violent breakup was the
result of internal crisis caused by deep historical, economic, national and religious
contradictions.
A. PREREQUISITESAND HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLA V CRISIS
The role of conflict in Yugoslavia's history. Conflict has always been an
inherent feature of the Balkans life. Historically the Balkan region has offered little
security to either persons or groups because it has always been a crossroads and a
borderland between Europe and Asia.
Ottoman Empire. For 500 years the Balkans had stayed under Ottoman Empire.
'The Ottoman Turks spent the better part of two centuries trying to conquer it,... and
another three centuries losing control of their northern empire..."25 . By the time of the
Ottoman invasion, the Serbs had already developed a strong national character. Invasion
by the Ottomans only served to intensify desires to maintain a Serbian identity. Equally
important, this nationalism focused on a strongly chauvinistic Serbian Orthodox Church
which served as a beacon for nationalist sentiment over the centuries, thus further
2
^ William J. Durch and James A. Senear. Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia In: UN
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars ofthe 1990s. /Ed. Durch W.J. Washington D.C.:
The Henry L. Stimson Center. NY: St. Martin's Press. 1996. P. 196.
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entangling the question of religion and ethnic identity.26 Other national groups underwent
similar circumstances.
Independence and the Berlin congress. Serbia, Romania, and an enlarged
Montenegro received independence in 1878, after a long struggle, under the Treaty of San
Stefano (March 3, 1878), which ended the Russo-Turkish War. The Congress of Berlin in
that same year gave Austria-Hungary a mandate over Bosnia-Herzegovina that angered
Serbia and Montenegro. In sum, according to the noted European historian Carlton J. H.
Hayes, "If before 1878 the 'Eastern Question' concerned one 'sick man', after 1878 it
involved a half-dozen maniacs. For the Congress of Berlin drove the Balkan peoples
mad."27
Another thirty years before W.W.I were saturated with continuous conflicts
between new independent states and increasing tensions between the Great Powers. The
Great Powers many times imposed peace settlements on the Balkans that, however,
permanently left nationalist expectations unfulfilled. The conflictual environment was
further undermined by the policies of the external powers, which exploited regional
conditions in order to extend their spheres of influence.
WW I and its implications. This brought about two short, brutal wars that
rearranged the political face of the Balkans once again in 1912-13. They also set the stage
for the Balkan crisis of July 1914, which turned the third Balkan War into World War I.
26 Robert J. Kerner, ed., Yugoslavia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, pp. 218-219.
27 Carlton J.H. Hayes, A Generation ofMaterialism, 1871-1900, New York: Harper, 1941, p. 33.
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The various alignments of the powers during the course of the war contributed to
unresolved tensions (territorial disputes) that continued to afflict the region after the post-
war settlements. Another critical consequence of the war was the considerable devastation
that significantly set back the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.28 Finally,
most states within the Balkans perceived the peace treaties following the war to be
imposed and unjust. 29
The postwar settlement brought Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro together
with several fragments of the former Austro-Hungarian empire (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
and Vojvodina) into a new state - the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, the authoritarian
regime of the inter-war era failed to resolve outstanding religious, ethnic, and nationalist
problems left over from World War I.
W.W.II and division of the Balkans. Under Nazi assault in 1941, Yugoslavia
swiftly dissolved, to be replaced by the pro-Nazi "Ustashe" regime in Croatia, while
mostly Serbs and Montenegrins actively fought the occupier. German and Italian reprisals
2° According to documents provided at the Versailles Peace Conference, Yugoslavia suffered 1,900,000
deaths (from all causes) during World War I. Of the 705,343 men Serbia mobilized during the war,
369,815 were killed or died of wounds. Similarly, Montenegro lost about 63,000 people, or roughly 25
percent of its prewar population. - See: L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, New York: Rinehart
and Co., Inc., 1958, pp. 632-633; Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic,
History of Yugoslavia, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, p. 501; Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and
Economic Change in Yugoslavia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 222-226.
™ William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy. Revised
Edition. Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. November 7, 1995, p.22.
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exacted a tremendous toll on Yugoslavia, but especially gross atrocities during WW. II
were committed against the Serbs. 30
The post-World War II division of the Balkans temporarily checked the warfare
that has plagued the region. 'Largely the result of the imposition of Communist regimes
in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and the fear that local conflict could lead
to superpower involvement, the region entered a seeming state of suspended historical
animation." 31
Tito's period and ripening "grapes of wrath". Under Tito's rule any ethnic
hostilities in the post WW II Yugoslavia were stopped and effectively prevented through
Tito's skillful manipulations, but mostly due to the average Yugoslav's income growing
steadily during Tito's lifetime. After Tito died in 1980, the average Yugoslav's income
shrank in real terms. 32 At the same time there had always been a considerable wealth gap
between different republics of Yugoslavia. By 1974, for example, the population of
Slovenia, the richest republic, was eight times wealthier, on average, than the population
of Kosovo, the poorest. 33 There had also formed and developed tensions between urban
and rural populations.
30 Total casualties of Yugoslavs in WW II came to approximately 1.7 million dead, mostly the Serbs, out
of a population of 16 million. - See Dedijer, et al, History of Yugoslavia, p. 415.
31 William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma, p. 24.
See Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1993, pp. 31,35.
33 Ibid.
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The beginning of the crisis. As the economy failed, so did the political cohesion
that was represented in collective presidency and Yugoslavia's Communist Party that fell
apart in January 1990. As the democratic changes prevailed all over the Europe,
nationalist sentiments and past animosities in Yugoslavia, constrained by Tito, quickly
bubbled to the surface. The political leaders of several Yugoslav republics irresponsibly
used nationalistic feelings for personal political ends. However, it was not just a struggle
among leaders. Many Serbs, Croats and other Yugoslavs willingly jumped into bloody
fighting, seeking to solve their problems and avenge past offenses. 34
B. ANAL YSIS OF UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE YUGOSLA V CRISIS
The conflict in the Balkans was caused by a number of interacting factors.
Localfeatures. Strong national character based on awareness of ethnic identity as
an ultimate value, and steeled by the 500 years of Ottoman rule, created a very strong will
of many in the Balkans to die or kill to protect their dignity. Historical offenses and
injustices permanently left nationalist expectations unfulfilled and religious animosities
unresolved. The interference of the Great Powers seeking to extend their spheres of
influence exacerbated the situation. As a result, violence had always been an accepted
agent of changing and rearranging the political face of the Balkans. These factors
34 Ted Gurr, however, argues that historical animosities or religious differences do not play crucial role in
the origins and dynamics of ethnopoltical conflict. "Such factors usually become significant because they
are invoked by contemporary ethnopolitical leaders seeking to mobilize support among threatened and
disadvantaged peoples..." - Ted R. Gurr. Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict. In:
Managing Global Chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict./Ed. by Chester A. Crocker
et. all. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, p. 74.
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determined lack of will to compromise because historically compromise represented
weakness and defeat that frequently in the past had meant death.
Historical, political, economical and personalities ' implications. Past historical
memories were complicated by more recent contingencies. Atrocities committed during
WW II against the Serbs not only by Germans and Italians but also by their fellow
countrymen left a deep scar on the Yugoslav political face. 35 Economic tensions, social
and cultural contradictions were constrained by Tito's manipulations, and not solved.
In 1980s Yugoslavia was weakened by its loss of the critical geopolitical position it
had occupied during the Cold War. This left the country with little strategic significance,
no alternative markets, and no new base for political and economic security. Economic
decline, accentuated by diminishing support from Western governments and institutions,
tore the economic and social fabric apart. That led to a political disintegration that was
inseparable from the more widespread process of European political fragmentation at the
end of the Cold War. Economic reforms demanded by foreign creditors undermined the
Yugoslav federal authority. In a highly decentralized government, local political leaders,
unwilling to compromise, began a quarrel over authority, resources, and, ultimately,
territory. The key Yugoslav protagonists' (Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic) behavior was
driven by nationalist sentiments. The declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia
on June 25, 1991, precipitated the crisis. However, both republics might have been
content to work out a loose federal agreement with Belgrade. But Milosevic insistence on
-' 5 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. NY: Harcourt Brace, 1996.
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Serb political predominance in a federal Yugoslavia closed that option. 36 On the other
hand, Izetbegovic's and Tudjman's unwillingness to consider Serb interests and sentiments
also strained the situation. 37 War ensued.
International response. The international community in 1991 misinterpreted the
upheaval as ethnic conflict and national revolution in the course of democratization, so it
could not respond correctly. 38 The EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was highly
controversial and was determined mostly not by principles of self-determination and
impartiality but by the need to preserve the EC's unity. Moreover, conflicts emerged
between European states, echoing the ominous confrontation before WW I: German's
proposals were openly defied by France and Great Britain. The recognition of Bosnia
that was made a few months later without effective guarantees precipitated violence,
which was not suprising given the new state's geographic location and the clear
opposition of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats that constituted substantial national minorities
in that country. 39 The Western states took side of the Croats and Bosnian government,
and at the same time refused to recognize and imposed sanctions on Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), although all the parties to conflict could be blamed
36 See Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death ofa Nation. NY: T.V. Books, 1996.
3
' See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. NY: Harcourt Brace, 1996.
3^ See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995.
39 See Marten Van Heuven, Understanding the Balkan Breakup: the three book review. Foreign Policy,
No. 103, Summer 1996, pp. 179-180.
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for noncompliance with the conditions agreed to by EC.40 EC countries were not prepared
to back up their diplomacy with force. That made the situation even more complicated and
pushed the parties to search for a solution by means of violence: the Croats and Muslims
understood the recognition as a signal of support of all their actions; the Serbs felt
themselves pushed to the corner.
All peace plans (Vance-Owen and other initiatives) were ultimately disavowed by
the warring parties because they did not meet their demands. EC countries were not
prepared to go beyond a negotiated peace agreed to by all the parties. Meanwhile the
parties did not see major powers involved, namely, Russia, Germany and Turkey, as
honest brokers in the crisis. The United States showed clear unwillingness to exert itself
on behalf of an unjust outcome. This sentiment, coupled with a determination not to
become involved militarily, was fundamental in shaping international community approach
in 1991-1993.
The UN's role. Under these circumstances the UN was ineffective due to the
unwillingness of the major powers to commit military forces sufficient to implement the
principles proclaimed by the Security Council resolutions. The collapse of the UN 'fcafe
40 The conditions agreed were based on guidelines elaborated by France for recognition of new states
emerging in Europe and included:
.
- acceptance of the United Nations, Helsinki Act and Paris Charter commitments on the rule of
law, democracy and human rights;
- guarantees of ethnic and minority rights;
- acceptance of the inviolability of frontiers;
- honoring disarmament and regional security commitments;
- arbitration to decide a structure to replace the old state;
- acceptance of the draft agreement on Yugoslavia's future, elaborated by the EC peace
conference.
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haven" concept, when the UN peacekeepers were not able to prevent the Muslims from
using the havens for their military purposes thus provoking the Serbs to attack them, as
well as to prevent the Serb atrocities after some of the save havens fell to their hands, was
the result of UNPROFOR's incapacity.
Taking sides in the conflict. These conditions encouraged the conflict parties to
tighten their demands and continue fighting. Under these circumstances, as it has already
been many times in the history of POs, outside mediators decided to take sides in the
conflict, press upon the stronger party (the Serbs) and make it accept the conditions of
peace agreement proposed by the US. The Serbs were warned that their military potential
must be destroyed. NATO commander for Southern Europe Admiral Leighton Smith and
UN Force commander Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier on 10 August, 1995 signed
'Memorandum of understanding" (MOU) on the execution of NATO air operations for
protection of the UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 41 By that time the
conflict had come to a stalemate, and the belligerents had already begun to understand
their inability to achieve their goals by military force.
Russia 's role. Russia, with its historical sympathies to the Serbs, had been deeply
involved in the Balkan conflict contributing a substantial military force for UNPROFOR
and was also seeking ways to resolve the conflict. Russian peace initiatives played a
significant role in attempts of the international community to stop hostilities in former
4
^Smith and Janvier Sign Agreement on NA TO Air Operations - HTTP://www.hrt.hr/vijesti/ oluja/
950810/ E100895194604.html.
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Yugoslavia. However, like the other peace proposals and plans, they failed to satisfy all
the warring parties while the Serbs controlled 70 percent of the Bosnian territory. The
situation changed after the Sarajevo market shelling in August 1995 that was assigned to
the Serbs artillery and followed by massive NATO air strikes and offensive of Bosnian
government troops against Serb positions. The Serbs accused NATO of 'genocide",
however, the latter denied that accusation, and stated that the only purpose was to make
the Serbs pull their heavy weapons out of the safety zone around Sarajevo.42
At the same time, while the Western countries decided to put pressure upon the
Serbs to end the conflict, Russia began feeling itself more and more isolated from the
process of decision-making on Bosnia, especially after the MOU with NATO was signed.
The point of primary concern for Russia was that this document, in particular, gave
NATO the right of independent decision-making on using force in Bosnia.43 The situation
became even more exacerbated after the Sarajevo market shelling that set the start of the
NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The Russian leadership felt themselves so
adversely impacted by this fact that President Yeltsin issued a statement on 7 September,
1995. In that statement, Yeltsin said that the ongoing NATO air strikes and artillery
shelling of the Bosnian Serbs undermined efforts for a political settlement and went
beyond the limits of the UNSC's decisions. They drew the international community into a
42 See Goltz, Alexandre. NATO Is Splitting Europe. "Krasnaya Zvezda", Sept. 14, 1995, p.3.
43 Russian leadership complained that this MOU was never discussed with Russia. This "veil of secrecy"
even more exacerbated Russia - NATO relations, although later this confidential document was eventually
published by Russian media. - See Markushin, Vadim and Alexandre Oleinik. A Memorandum of
"Peacekeeping" - a Deal Behind the Russia's Back. "Krasnaya Zvezda", Sept. 15, 1995, p.3.
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conflict against one of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia. He said, Russia would
have to carefully weigh its strategy and its approach to relations with the North Atlantic
alliance, if such a policy continued.44
Negotiations start. On 8 September, 1995 a meeting in Geneva among the Foreign
Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) resulted in the announcement of an agreement
among those Governments on the basic principles for a peace accord. Those principles
included the continued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its present
international borders, and for Bosnia to consist of two democratic entities, the existing
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, with a 5 1 percent to
49 percent territorial division between the two entities.
However, air strikes continued till 13 September, to make the Serbs comply with
the NATO ultimatum and pull out their heavy weapons out of the 20 km exclusion zone
around Sarajevo. At the same time the Bosnian government, despite the UN and NATO's
call upon all the parties to cease immediately all offensive military activities and hostile
acts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina45 , decided to capitalize on the moment,
and launched a successful offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. By 12 October, 1995, when
the truce agreement came into force, the Muslim-Croat Federation had regained a
44 Security Council. Press Release SC/6096. 8 September 1995. GOPHER:// marvin. nc3a. nato. int/ 00/
yugo/sc6096.
45 Joint statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Press Release (95)85. 14 September 1995. HTTP:
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/pr85.95.
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substantial part of territory lost during 1991-1994, and controlled about 50 percent of the
Bosnian territory while another 50 percent remained under Serb control.
Creation of the coalition. In the end of September, 1995 the ministers of foreign
affairs from Bosnia, Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia met in New York and
agreed to conduct elections in Bosnia, adopt a Constitution, elect president and court. It
was agreed that the guarantor of this process would be NATO-led force including Russian
military contingent that must replace the UN troops and control the implementation of
peace agreement. At the same time there were still some 'technical problems", and the
most difficult among them was the chain of command - Russia did not want to submit its
troops under NATO command.
After the general concept of Bosnian peace operation was adopted, NATO
demonstrated a flexible approach toward Russia's form of participation in planning and
command procedures. Initially Russian leadership proposed to create a special
International Committee or Council for political guidance of the mission. This Committee
was proposed to include the countries contributing military contingents and responsible
for the mission conduct. Russian side also proposed two types of the chain of command:
1). Russian contingent is placed under Russian command that reports directly to
this special Committee;
2). A unified command is created as a kind of a Military Staff under the special
Committee where a Russian representative among others has the right of a decisive vote. 46
46 See Interview with Colonel General Vladimir Zhurbenko, First Deputy of the Chief of General Staff of
Russian Armed Forces. Krasnaya Zvezda", October 18, 1995, p.3.
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The final concept of Russian participation in peace operation in Bosnia was
worked out during the meetings of Russian Defense Minister with his US and NATO
counterparts in October and November 1995. A compromise was achieved to create a
special Consultative Committee comprised of NATO and Russian representatives. This
Committee would conduct regular meetings at ambassadors' level or higher and
implement the political guidance of the Bosnian mission. Russia would be informed of all
decisions, give recommendations to the NATO Council and influence all decisions related
to the Russian contingent 47
The problem of the military control of a Russian brigade operating in an American
division was also successfully solved. To get around the problem it was agreed that
Russia's 2,000-3,000 troops would be commanded by a Russian general. The general in
turn would report to U.S. General George Joulwan, NATO's top commander. Russian
troops would be assigned peacekeeping tasks separate from the NATO peace
implementation force, and therefore would not technically come under NATO's chain of
command. 48
Dayton agreements. On 21 November 1995, three of the main parties to the
conflict in former Yugoslavia reached agreement on a framework for peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The talks had been taking place at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in
47 See Peltz, Alexandre. Russia Will Participate in Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia on a Par with
NATO, and Not Subordinate to It. "Krasnaya Zvezda", October 30, 1995, p.l.
4° U.S., Russia Iron Out Agreement on Peace Force. CNN daily reports on the Balkan conflict.
November 9, 1995. HTrP://www.cnn.comAVORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/ll-08/troops/index.html.
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Dayton, Ohio for 20 days. The formal signing of the agreement took place 14 December
1995 in Paris. The "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina"
covered a broad range of areas, including the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of
troops, post-conflict peace building, and a remodeling of the political structures to
accommodate the different fractions. The military aspects of the plan were drawn up in
Annex 1A: Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement. By signing the agreement, the three
parties agreed to the plan and to the deployment of a Multinational Implementation Force
(IFOR) lead by NATO. IFOR substituted the UN military presence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that had been conducting peacekeeping tasks since their introduction into the
area in 1992.
On 15 December 1995 the Security Council, 'acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter", authorized Member States to establish a multinational military
Implementation Force (IFOR), under unified control and command 'to ensure compliance
with the provisions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina."49
4" Security Council Unanimously Authorizes Multinational Military Implementation Force to
Ensure Compliance with Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Security Council.
SC/6143. 15
December 1995. HTTP: gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/yugo/sc6143.
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SUMMARY
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia stemmed from multiple interacting causes
that are represented in Chart 4. 50
Chart 4. Multiple Causes of the Yugoslav Crisis
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^ito's Manipulation of Ethnic Groups
and Territories
Multiple peace initiatives aimed at stopping hostilities failed because they did not
meet the parties' demands. Peacekeeping operation UNPROFOR also could not surmount
the rising resentment of the local factions. Bloody fights continued in the former
Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia, during 1991-1995 until the warring parties agreed to
cease fire.
One of the reasons for that agreement was that the conflict had come to a
stalemate, and conflict parties already clearly understood their inability to achieve their
goals by means of military force. Another important factor was that the Serbs, as the
stronger party, having seized 70 % of the Bosnian territory, was put under strong
50 The Chart is based on William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma, pp. 5-6.
45
international political and military pressure and began losing their territorial gains. Russia
with its traditional relations with the Serbs also understood that the conflict had come to a
stalemate, grudgingly had to give up some principles, and push Milocevich and Karadzic
to agree to fifty-fifty partition of Bosnia. After the Muslims and Croats regained a
substantial part of territory lost during 1991-1994 war, and with about 50 percent of
Bosnian territory remaining under Serb control, the international pressure shifted to
another conflict party - the Bosnian government, and hostilities were eventually stopped.
From Russia's and NATO part a lot of flexibility and compromise was shown
while the coalition was forming, particularly in solving the problem of chain of command.
The Dayton Peace Accord signed in November 1995 was a remarkable event that
brought an end to a dangerous turmoil in Europe. On 20 December, after the UNSC
resolution 1031 was approved, authorizing the establishment of IFOR, the new mission
took over operations in Bosnia from UNPROFOR and peacekeeping responsibilities
transferred to NATO command.
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IV. UNPROFOR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
FAILURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS
UNPROFOR is the biggest, the most expensive and the most complex peace
operation in the history of the United Nations. Its goals were both military and political in
nature: to keep the peace and build confidence between the warring sides; to help achieve
a final political solution; and to restore normal life to former Yugoslavia.
A. UNPROFOR'S CHRONOLOGYAND MISSIONS
Historical background. UNPROFOR was initiated after the Yugoslav collective
presidency and the Federal Assembly on 27 December 1991 asked the United Nations to
take over control of the peace process from European Council. On 8 January, 1992 the
United Nations Security Council unanimously approved the deployment of an advance
force in the planned operation to send 10,000 United Nations peacekeeping troops to
Yugoslavia. An advance party led by the first Force Commander, General Satish Nambiar
of India, arrived in Croatia on March 8, 1992 to prepare the deployment of the UN
Protection Force.
On 7 April 1992 after fights broke out in Bosnia the UN SC passed Resolution
749 on the full deployment of the UN Protection Force. The number of UNPROFOR
personnel, including military, police and civilian staff, as of March 1995, totaled more than
40,000 people from 29 countries. 51
51 Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR.. Department of Public Information, United Nations. 31 August,
1996. HTTP://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm
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During the UNPROFOR mandate fatalities total number reached 210, among them
199 were military personnel. 73 peacekeepers were killed in hostile acts and more than
500 wounded. 52
Besides UNPROFOR's civil and military departments, several relief and other
international agencies took part in the UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia. They
included the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the UN Culture and Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Program (WFP),
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union Task
Force (ECTF).
UNPROFOR's missions and their accomplishment. UNPROFOR was initially,
established in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and
security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.
UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure that the three "United Nations Protected Areas"
(UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were
protected from fear of armed attack. In the course of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was
enlarged to include monitoring functions in certain other areas of Croatia ("pink zones");
to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform
immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and to
JZ Fatalities by Mission andAppointment Type. United Nations Fatalities. UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. HTTP: //www.un.org./Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatall.htm
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include monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula and to ensure control
of the Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones".
In addition, UNPROFOR monitored implementation of a cease-fire agreement
signed by the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities in March 1994 following a
flare-up of fighting in January and September 1993.
In June 1992, as the conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and
functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that
city and its environs. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to
enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to
deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of
released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In
addition, the Force monitored the "no-fly" zone, banning all military flights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council
around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo.
UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in self-defense, and to coordinate with
NATO the use of air power in support of its activities. Similar arrangements were
subsequently extended to the territory of Croatia. UNPROFOR also monitored the
implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian
Croat forces in February 1994. In addition, UNPROFOR monitored cease-fire
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arrangements negotiated between Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs forces, which
entered into force on 1 January 1995.
In December 1992, UNPROFOR was also deployed in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, to monitor and report any developments in its border areas which
could undermine confidence and stability in that Republic and threaten its territory. On 3
1
March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with
three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations.
UNPROFOR is considered 'an improvised, last-resort operation" 53 that was a
general failure. It did not manage to effectively monitor cease-fire, protect safe zones and
provide conditions for continuous humanitarian assistance.
B. ANALYSIS OF UNPROFOR
Roots offailure. The deployment of the UN forces began in a country that was
falling apart, and although the new parts of it were recognized by the international
community, their governments were not in control of the territories they claimed. The
UN's mission required the cooperation of the warring parties. Such cooperation was not
to be found, however, because the Vance-Owen plan did not address the issue that
triggered the conflict - who rules the Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia. This plan
gave UNPROFOR no license to implement agreed provisions by force. When it was
53 William J. Durch and James A. Senear, Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, p. 249.
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realized that implementing the Vance-Owen plan was impractical, the UN operation had
already failed to justify the expectations of the conflict parties.
What is striking is the number of the Security Council resolutions and presidential
statements adopted during 1992-1995 in connection with the former Yugoslavia: there are
more than one hundred of them. They are indicative of the different character of this
mission's mandate, with many ambiguities and contradictions. The readiness of the
Security Council to set a new assignment to the operation combined with its reluctance to
approve the funds necessary impeded the peace-keepers' work on the ground.
Disagreements among the Security Council members often resulted in impasses.
The countries which had contributed troops, and the big powers which had no troops of
their own on the ground took different positions toward the use of force, or with regard to
the lifting of the arms embargo from the Bosnian government. That created the impression
that the international community was very much divided.
UNPROFOR, in the eyes of the parties, took sides in the conflict from the very
beginning. Without the UN's arrival in 1992, the JNA might have remained engaged in
Croatia to the advantage of the local Serbs. In Bosnia the UN's intervention actually
changed the war's outcome from a quick Serb win to a war of attrition. Even
UNPROFOR' s humanitarian efforts in Bosnia (reopening traffic, food delivery, etc.)
actually favored the Muslims, giving them strategic depth and interior lines of
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communication. It was the Croats and Muslims who clearly gained the most from the
UN's presence, and the Serbs saw that. 54
At the final stage of the operation UNPROFOR became 'militarily engaged" (in
UN's words) and openly took sides in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs, thus finally
losing the UN's image of impartiality.
'UNPROFOR, neither loved nor feared by any of the parties, found itself
handicapped in promoting dialogue and lacking the clout necessary to compel hostile
parties to negotiate". 55
So, when in December 1995 UNPROFOR was replaced by IFOR there were no
regrets about this from any side.
UNPROFOR's achievements. However, UNPROFOR did have some gains.
UNPROFOR can claim credit for having helped to prevent a larger conflict, and did not
give it any chance to spill over the borders of Croatia and Bosnia. The UN also managed
to protect small minorities from violence in the higher risk areas, and also carried out an
enormous humanitarian task. It managed to monitor cease-fire along the Muslim-Croat
line of confrontation. The UN's presence actually saved Sarajevo and delayed the collapse
54 William J. Durch and James A. Senear, Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, pp. 223,
252.
55 See William J. Durch and James A. Senear, Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, pp.
249-250.
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of Srebrenica and Zepa for more than two years - its humanitarian assistance allowed it to
bring several hundred thousand tons of relief supplies into Bosnia. 56
Actually, UNPROFOR prepared the grounds for IFOR. It had closely cooperated
with NATO during the whole length of the conflict. The relations between UNPROFOR
and NATO were voluminous. The NATO marine forces were patrolling the Adriatic,
where they were overseeing and enforcing the economic sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro. The NATO aircraft were enforcing the Security Council "no-fly" resolution,
by preventing the military aircraft of the warring sides to fly over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
NATO was also giving close air support when the lightly armed UN personnel got into
situations in which they could not defend themselves against armed attacks. Besides that,
at the request of the UN, NATO carried out air strikes in the so-called "no heavy
weaponry areas" and "safe areas".
Thus, UNPROFOR made some very important preconditions for NATO-led
intervention and also contributed its experienced personnel to it. Prior to IFOR's
deployment several elements that had been part of UNPROFOR transferred to NATO
command. General Janvier became deputy to IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith,
who as NATO CINCSOUTH had been in command of NATO air forces operating over
Bosnia. The majority of UNPROFOR' s NATO and non-NATO contingents also
transferred to NATO command.
56 From July 1992 until April 1995 there were roughly 265,000 tons of food and other relief items
brought to Sarajevo by airlift and road convoys. - See William J. Durch and James A. Schear, Faultlines:
UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, pp. 250-251.
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SUMMARY
UNPROFOR is considered a general failure. It did not manage to effectively
monitor the cease-fire, protect safe zones, or provide conditions for continuous
humanitarian assistance.
There were several objective causes for that.
The Security Council's strategy was a reflection of the political disagreements
between the organization's major member states. That led to a cautious, risk-averse field
operation.
The UN's mission from the very beginning stuck to an impractical Mandate and
peace plan, with the task to support partial cease-fires under controversial political
agendas. Thus, the UN presence actually helped to 'push the conflict around", while its
humanitarian intervention became obvious targets of manipulation by the warring factions.
Moreover, this intervention affected the local balance of power, and thus even made local
parties suspicious or contemptuous of the intervention, rather than supportive or
respectful.
The UNPROFOR intervention lacked impartiality from the very beginning, and
was subject to manipulation, thus actually causing negative attitudes of all the conflict
parties. On the final stage of the operation the UN troops finally traded their impartiality
for open partisanship in the conflict.
However, UNPROFOR did have some essential achievements. It isolated the
conflict and even abated it to some extent. It played an invaluable role in humanitarian
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relief, and allowed humanitarian agencies to carry out their work. The UN's troops arrival
also played an important role in preventing the Yugoslav army (JNA) from open and
active participation in the civil war, although it eventually stretched out the conflict.
There are obviously limits to the UN peace efforts in a fierce civil war. The UN
forces on the ground may serve only as a temporary instrument for lessening the cruelties
of an armed conflict and the plight of the innocent population. At the same time, any
mandate to operate in an active war zone is bound to be charged politically. However, the
results scored by them in Bosnia are indisputable and their presence there was more than
justifiable.
The UN's attempt to intervene in the height of the brutal civil war even more
deserves all the respect because when nobody wanted to sacrifice, this organization made
an outstanding effort to stop the war. It failed to do this, but paved the way for the




The decision to create the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (familiarly known as the
Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the international
community's objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. It marked
also the general concert about national objectives among the main geopolitical players in
the region: United States, NATO and Russia. For Russia complying with this general
concert required much more concessions than from its Western counterparts. The list of
failures of Russian foreign policy published by 'Nezavisimaya gazeta"at the end of 1995
stated that 'Russia has been ousted from the process of the Balkans and Middle East
settlement", while among the successes listed was the agreement on Russian brigade
participation in NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia. 57 Anyway, by "swallowing its
principles" Russian leadership contributed to the end of the Yugoslav wars that had a
significant effect on the calculations of Russian nationalist forces of the costs and benefits
of intervention in Serb interests as well as on behalf of the millions of Russians who live
outside the borders of the Russian Federation. 58
57 Nezavisimaya gazeta. 30 December, 1995, p. 1.
58 Reneo Lukic, Allen Lynch. Europefrom the Balkans to the Urals.The Disintegration ofYugoslavia
and the Soviet Union. HTTP://www.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/llbkl.html
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IFOR's primary mission was to maintain cessation of hostilities, move Serbs and
Croats into separate zones, and provide support for civilian implementation of the Dayton
Accords. The Russian brigade deployed in IFOR was initially 1,500 strong and was drawn
from the 98th Guards Airborne Division based at Ivanovo in the Moscow Military District.
In Bosnia, the brigade was under operational C2 of American commander, multinational
division North, and based around the Posavina corridor. That was one of the most
important and difficult missions regarding the significance applied by the warring parties to
that parcel of land.
'The relationship of the US-led TF Eagle and the separate Russian Airborne
Brigade is one of operational normalcy. The Russian Brigade, one of five TF maneuver
brigades, operates smoothly and seamlessly with its US headquarters and multinational
sister units. This success was not an accident: it is a result of careful planning, a common
strategic objective and unparalleled professionalism."59
A. MILITARYSUCCESS VS. FULL-SCALE SETTLEMENT?
While NATO forces and their partners in IFOR have played a critical and
successful role in halting the conflict in Bosnia and bringing stability to the region, military
success in the short term has not led to a long-term political settlement. Such a resolution
is primarily determined by resolving internal political, economic, and societal issues within
59 Major Charles J. McLaughlin, US Army. US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace.
Military Review, July-August 1997, No. 4, pp. 129-131.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this mostly depends on the will of the former warring factions
(FWF). As William Johnsen noted, 'Near universal agreement exists that a long-term
resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in the factions, assisted by the
international community, implementing the civil portions of the peace agreement."60
However, the ability of an outside military presence to sustain conditions that support the
other elements of the peace process in Bosnia has played a crucial role in establishing
important preconditions for resolving these issues.
1. The Criteria of Success
Low casualties. The PO in Bosnia was a military success in terms of low
casualties. Certainly, the resolution to implement the Dayton Accords has deterred the
warring factions both from targeting each other as well as IFOR personnel. Even so,
critics were quick to point out that IFOR's role was passive and reactive insofar as it had
to wait until lives had been threatened before it could act. However, other than casualties
suffered from accidents and landmines, IFOR was never attacked.
Rules ofengagement. One reason for this relative security was that, beyond having
massive firepower at its disposal, all IFOR units (both NATO and non-NATO) operated
under the same robust rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE went beyond the right to
use deadly force in self defense to include the right for IFOR to use force to accomplish its
mission.
"0 William T. Johnsen. U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint. Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. June 20, 1996.
59
"Mission creep ". Another reason for this relative security was a strong opposition
of the military to 'mission creep" and assigning IFOR police functions, in particular,
tracking down the indicted war criminals. That function was the responsibility of the
civilian side of the peace implementation operation. IFOR personnel had the authority to
detain any persons who interfered with the IFOR mission or those individuals who might
be indicted for war crimes, but they did not try to track them down. This was not wishful
thinking, but sober calculation. The situation represented a complex dilemma for IFOR:
having to treat with those it must apprehend (Tujman and Milocevic, in particular).
Staying aside of police functions has largely promoted the image of peacekeepers as
impartial force, facilitated their cooperation with FWF, and contributed to creating safe
conditions of the operation.
Political dimension. Of equal importance to the military success was the political
dimension. The international community, the Russian and US governments in particular,
have invested much effort and political capital in creating an environment in which the
parties in former Yugoslavia have more of a stake in peace than in prosecuting the civil
war any further. Unlike Somalia and Rwanda, prior to beginning of IFOR mission there
was established the cooperation of the leaders of the warring factions and guaranteed their
cooperation with the peace-keepers. The US Administration did not commit the strength
of a potent military force until after it had negotiated an agreement that the warring parties
themselves wanted to see succeed.
"In simple terms, there was a carrot as well as a stick."61
61 Peter Saracino. Mean Dogs and Wise Owls Need Each Other. International Defense Review. July 1,
1996. Vol. 29; No. 7 ; P. 1.
60
2. BFOR/SFOR's Achievements
IFOR's missions and their accomplishment. In the military sphere, IFOR has
accomplished much in a short period. The primary mission of IFOR's Operation Joint
Endeavor was to ensure compliance among the parties to the Dayton peace agreement,
especially in the cessation of hostilities, establishment of zones of separation between
opposing forces, and in the establishment of "cantonments" of heavy arms. This was
accomplished. Its secondary mission was to assist in the prevention of interference of the
movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons, and to respond
appropriately to deliberate violence. That was accomplished also. IFOR also contributed
greatly to freedom of movement by monitoring and clearing minefields as well as by
building or repairing roads and bridges. 62
The IFOR mission has been successful since its very early stages and substantial
compliance with the Peace Agreement (PA) has been monitored.
In particular, Joint Military Commissions were established immediately and have
been very effective in allowing proper exchange of information among all concerned
parties. No significant military activity has been conducted by the Parties throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR has been granted the requested freedom of movement. Air
defense radars were shut down. Negotiations began — under the auspices of the OSCE ~
to discuss confidence-building and arms reductions issues. Parties have complied with
62 This assessment is made on the basis of Task Force Eagle's Measure of Success Matrix. See Joint
Military Commissions. Newsletter No. 96-8. Appendix A. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Sept. 1996.
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IFOR instructions to vacate selected positions along the confrontation line in the Sarajevo
area.
However, IFOR failed to obtain substantial cooperation from the FWF and did not
succeed in building confidence between them. 63
On December 20, 1996 ceremonies were held marking the end of the IFOR
mandate and the beginning of the SFOR's mandate.
SFOR 's missions and their accomplishment. It was decided that a force smaller
than IFOR but more robust than traditional UN peacekeeping forces was needed to
provide shift from "implementation to stabilization". Recognizing that maintaining a
reduced military presence would be necessary to stabilize the peace after IFOR's mandate,
NATO initiated operation JOINT GUARD in December 1 996 and set up the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) with the same rules of engagement, but reduced force structure, and with a
mandate until June 1998. One of the tasks of SFOR is the prevention of a resumption of
fighting, to help civil organizations rebuild the war-torn country and provide security for
local elections. It was stated that it would be more the task of the Bosnian government to
keep Bosnia's peace and stability.
The new mission was assigned with approximately 30,000 troops to start, and
approximately 13,500 troops at the end of 1997. SFOR includes approximately 8,500 US
troops, and consists of relatively more non-NATO troops. During IFOR, 15% of the
63 Ibid.
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troops originated from non-NATO states but with SFOR this percentage has risen to
40%. 64
IFOR had created the basis for a secure environment, but that foundation was
fragile, and much remained to be accomplished by SFOR: arbitrate control of Brcko
(accomplished), resettle refugees (not accomplished), build political institutions
(accomplished), hold elections (accomplished), restore the Bosnian economy (positive
processes began), negotiate and implement arms control and confidence-building regimes
(partially accomplished), bring the war criminals to the prosecution (mostly not
accomplished).
The elections held and political institutions built, however, marked the partition of
Bosnia along an Inter-entity boundary line" 65 . The most dangerous is that the partition is
actually going on the level of national consciousness - the school education of Muslims,
Croats and Serbs goes according to different programs; the Croatian and Serbian
passports are issued in addition to Bosnian ones66 . That, of course, impedes
implementation of the confidence-building regime, and in future may adversely affect the
arms control.
64 See S.T. Planken. Stabilization Force. Operation Joint Guard. December 6, 1996. HTTP:// www.
cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_sfor.html. Update: 7 September 1997.
65 See Richard Holbrooke, Backsliding in Bosnia. Time, May 20, 1996. P.38.
6° See Sonia Winter. Bosnia: Senator Biden Declares Lasting Commitment. Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. Washington, 9 October 1997.
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In the economic sphere a lot has been done. The SFOR's emphasis was more upon
the civilian tasks and deterrence, however the reduction in the force's size meant that
fewer engineers and other specialists were available to assist in rebuilding Bosnia's
infrastructure.
The attempts to resettle refugees failed despite economic sanctions imposed on the
parties to facilitate this process. A wave of killings targeting Croats in Bosnia has recently
again aggravated tensions in the country's Moslem-Croat Federation and jeopardized plans
for refugees to return to their homes. 67
The SFOR's attempt to adopt a more aggressive stance toward indicted war
criminals almost blew up the relative peace in Bosnia, and exacerbated Serb suspicions
about peacekeepers' impartiality. The danger of 'hiission creep" was revealed clearly on
10 July, 1997 when in Bosnia-Herzegovina SFOR arrested one Serb indicted for war
crimes and killed another one in a fire fight. It led to mass protests of the Bosnian Serbs.
The president of Republika Srpska Plavsic rejected the SFOR action because it might
deteriorate the current situation in Republika Srpska. Russian authorities also rejected the
action and said that might reconsider their contribution to SFOR. 68
67 Tensions High After Murders of Bosnian Croats. Reuters. October 29, 1997. HTTP:// www2.
infoseek.com/Content?ara=a0474LBY660reulb-19971029&qt=Russia+and+Bosnia&lk=noframes&cob
NX&kt=A&ak=news 1486
68 S.T. Planken. Chronology ofKey Events. Part III: SFOR. (August 1, 1997 - present). HTTP: //www.
cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_chronology_sfor_b. html
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According to some views, there is no legal requirement for NATO to actively
pursue indicated war criminals. Moreover, military action in Bosnia similar to that initiated
in Somalia could destabilize the entire peace process. 69
However, other Balkan analysts say the SFOR must turn to a more aggressive
stance that requires the removal from power of indicted war criminal and wartime Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic, who continues to wield covert power in Bosnian Serb
territory. 70
The duration of SFOR and its acceptable End State, as some analysts say, should
be conditions-dependent. Civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, on which
sustained peace depends, will take far longer than SFOR's own mission. Therefore a
continued military presence will be required in order to maintain the security essential to
civilian implementation. As a minimum, the conditions for withdrawal should be a state of
reduced tensions that allows for hand-over to a traditional peacekeeping force or
observers, perhaps under the UN or OSCE. 71 However, to date this state has not been
achieved yet. According to Samuel Berger, situation in Bosnia now is a slow-boiling crisis
that can easily disintegrate without intensive and continuing international intervention. 72
69 See F.M.Lorenz. War Criminals - Testing the Limits of Military Force. Joint Forces Quarterly.
Summer 1997, pp. 59-65.
70 Dan De Luce. NATO Toughens Stance on Bosnia Peacekeeping. Reuters, October 30, 1997.
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3. The Implications of SFOR's Early Withdrawal
Dayton agreements and "realistic course ". If SFOR withdraws before conditions
for a lasting political settlement are established, three general outcomes are possible:
peaceful resolutionf'A unified country"), limited violence ("Partition"), and a return to
war. Only a peaceful resolution is in the interests of international community as well as of
Russia or US, but it is the least likely result now. At the heart of the debate on Bosnia now
is disagreement over whether the goal of a unified, multiethnic Bosnia that was established
by the Dayton peace agreement is realistic. Increasingly, voices in Congress, in U.S.
foreign policy circles and of some analysts have been arguing that a de facto partition of
Bosnia among its rival factions is inevitable and the most realistic course. 73
However, according to Richard Holbrooke, the partition of Bosnia along an 'inter-
entity boundary line" that resembles other divided lands - Korea and Cyprus, is not an
acceptable option. 74 It is the most dangerous trend now because it will increase the
chances of war and destabilize the entire area of southeastern Europe. "Changing the
Dayton Accords to impose partition would be immoral and a terrible thing to do. It would
73 John F. Harris. Berger: U.S. Must Stay Involved in Bosnia. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger,
speaking at Georgetown University in Washington, said Bosnia's recovery from a civil war has been
"painfully slow." Washington Post. Sept. 24, 1997; P. A27; Optimistic NATO Keeps Troop Pullout Plan.
Western Experts See Slim Chance For Bosnian Unity. Defense News. August 19, 1996 / August 25, 1996.
P. 8.
74 Richard Holbrooke, Backsliding in Bosnia. Time, May 20, 1996. P.38.
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probably result in a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia and a landlocked rump ministate
around Sarajevo and Tuzla for the Muslims", Holbrooke said. 75
Partition - the way to war. If the international military presence is pulled out of
Bosnia now and prevailing conditions are not sustained, it seems that among three
scenarios ( "A unified country"; "Partition"; and "A return to war*), the most realistic
is the second one (Partition) that may represent little more than an operational pause
before the factions resume fighting. An increasing number of politicians and editorialists
are now prepared to accept the partition of Bosnia, even though that would represent the
defeat of the Dayton Accords. However, as US President National Security Adviser
Samuel Berger has recently warned, if the Dayton accords collapse and the Serbs,
Muslims and Croats revert to war, it would 'potentially lead to a wider war in
southeastern Europe."76
The needfor military presence. These conclusions argue for a continued outside
military presence to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Bosnia can survive
only if it has peaceful conditions to create institutions capable of containing ethnic
struggles that once led to war. No institution is more important to the peace than the
Bosnian Federation, which is supposed to govern the 5 1 percent of the country under
control of the Muslims and Croats. The Dayton peace agreement assumes the existence of
75 Sonia Winter. Bosnia: Senator Biden Declares Lasting Commitment. Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. Washington, 9 October 1997.
76 Clifford Krauss. Stay in Bosnia likely to be extended. Adviser paves way for longer peacekeeping
mission, but Clinton decision still pending. New York Times. September 24, 1997.
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a solid Federation, which will combine with a Serb Republic to constitute a new Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Federation is an essential building block, without which it is
difficult to expect Dayton to succeed over the long term. 77 At the same time, even more
attention should be paid to confidence-building measures between the Federation and
Republika Srpska. One of the critical conditions here is full impartiality of SFOR.
At the same time, to avoid a protracted fate in Bosnia, NATO must develop a
realistic exit strategy, and then refine it as events unfold. That could mean a follow-on
enforcement role as a bridge to traditional peacekeeping, and, ultimately, to independent
self-governance. One of the possible exit strategies might be a gradual shrinking of
NATO-led operation and increasing of Europe's share in Bosnian peacekeeping. 78
However, that will mean the reducing of the US brokering role on the Balkans and their
partition along European geopolitical faultlines.
Anyway, if momentum can be maintained toward peace, NATO should be able to
turn its mission over to a traditional UN-style peacekeeping force in one to two years. A
worthwhile objective would be to organize, fund and administer such a force, if not under
the UN which has become overstretched, then under the OSCE. This scenario seems more
77 See Daniel Serwer. Bosnia: Peace by Piece. Strategic Forum, Number 81, July 1996. National Defense
University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. HTTP://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/strforurn/forum81.htrnl
78 See Bigger Role For Europe in Next Bosnia Force-Ruehe. Reuters. October 29, 1997. HTTP:// www2.
infoseek. co/Content?arn= al555LBY988reulb-19971029&qt= Russia+and+Bosnia&lk= noframes&col=
NX&kt=A&ak=newsl486; John Hillen. After SFOR - Planning a European-Led Force. Joint Forces
Quaterly. Spring 1997, pp. 75-78.
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viable than any other and more peaceful than equipping and training the Muslim-Croat
Federation military forces as opposed to the Bosnian Serb army. 79
There is also another aspect in continuing military presence. It is absolutely true
that early withdrawal of peacekeepers from Bosnia may do a significant damage to
evolving NATO-Russian and U.S. -Russian relations, for Russian participation in IFOR has
global implications. The other critical issue is the growing trust being built between
NATO, the United States, and Russia after 50 years of intense confrontation. That trust
might be affected by the early withdrawal from Bosnia and a subsequent collapse of the
Dayton Accords. 80
B. RUSSIA-US COOPERATION IN BOSNIA: TWO VIEWS ON FUTURE JOINT
PEACE OPERATIONS
American view. The success of combined US-Russian operations in the
Implementation Force's (IFOR's) Task Force (TF) Eagle has shattered any misconception
that American and Russian soldiers, who faced each other as opponents for so long, could
79 The issue of equipping and training of Federation forces is outside of the Dayton Agreement. As
Reuters has recently reported, "The United States believes arms control agreements alone cannot achieve
a military balance; and that Federation forces will need additional arms and training to establish parity
and provide for self-defense. To this end, the United States may pledge $100 million in military
equipment. Although not IFOR's mission, establishing a military balance has become a task to be
completed before external forces can be withdrawn. European countries have refused to contribute funds
to the program, and say it merely increases the risk of war between the federation and the country's Serb
entity
. Only the United States and Islamic states have donated funds and weaponry to the Federation
military."- See "U.S. Clears Delivery of Tanks for Bosnian Army." Reuters. October 23, 1997.
°0 William T. Johnsen. U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint. Strategic Studies




not work side-by-side in the cause of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR/SFOR have
proved that NATO and Russia are able to act together in the interest of European security.
It is well recognized that throughout the IFOR deployment, relations with Russian forces
have been excellent. 81 It has made American military optimistic about the potential for
joint peacekeeping with their Russian counterparts. 82
Russian view. However, not everyone on the Russian side is so optimistic on this
point. Some Russian analysts argue that when IFOR had been planed Russian foreign
policy was dictated not so much by Russia's national interests, but only by then Foreign
Minister Audrey Kozirev's political preferences that made him 'follow blindly after the US
policy." That led to mutual disappointments between Russia and US and may cause
unwillingness of Moscow to compromise with Washington in the future on the issues
where normally there would be no problems. 83
Russian analysts recognize that it was NATO military intervention conducted
under the US pressure and leadership that opened a real prospect to peaceful settlement in
°1 See, for example, General George A. Joulwan (SACEUR), "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," The Washington
Post, April 28, 1996, p. C3; Ruth Walker, "US and Russian Soldiers Salute 'Trench Peacefare,'" The
Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1996, p. 1; and Tim Weiner, "Out of the Cold: U.S. and Russian
Spies Share Cloaks in Bosnia," The New York Times, January 19, 1996, p. 9.
82 Jack Hoschouer. NATO Commander Cites Hurdles to Brigade With Russia. Defense News. March 24,
1997 / March 30, 1997. P. 10; Charles J. McLaughlin. US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for
Peace. Military Review, July-August 1997, No. 4, pp. 129-131.
OJ Aleksey Pushkov, The Time of Voluntary Dependency on West Has Gone. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16
November, 1995, pp. 1, 5.
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Bosnia. 84 At the same time it is also recognized that Russia has been actually ousted from
the Balkans, where Russia's interests have always had at least two dimensions:
1. Geostrategical dimension. The Balkans being the part of Black Sea -
Mediterranean basin have always been the most important component of Russia's southern
line of communication, which provides one of the most important ways to the world
commercial traffic lines.
2. Geopolitical dimension. The Balkans are a key part of a joint geopolitical
zone, including Asia Minor, Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which constitutes
the zone of Russia's vital interests.
One of the examples how the Russian establishment views the prospects of the
Bosnian experience is the opinion expressed by Yuri Baturin, Secretary of the Defense
Council of Russian Federation. 85 According to his view, peace operation in Bosnia is more
an exception than a rule because of the following conditions:
• NATO in Bosnia replaced the UN peacekeeping forces, took the side of
Muslim-Croat coalition and used a "double standards" approach to the conflict;
• The cooperation between Russia and NATO in Bosnia has been rather limited
and not equal. The operation was prepared without Russia, and Russian leadership will not
agree to accept such a passive role in the future;
84 Morozov A.N. NATO in the Former Yugoslavia: A Change in the Balkans Geopolitical Face.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 14 November, 1996, pp.1, 4.
85 Yuri Baturin Maintains that NATO Bosnian Experience Does Not Fit to Providing European Security.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 28 November, 1996, pp. 1-2.
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• Russia had to agree to the Bosnian peace operation and to participation in it
because it was the only way to implement the Dayton Accords and lift the anti-Serb
sanctions;
• The peace operation funding is not under the UN control and is made up of the
contributions of the participating countries, this threatens the democratic principle of
voting and replaces it by the "right of property".
• The Bosnian solution used a unique model of a state building that included two
equal components - Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat Federation. This is a transitional
and unstable model that may develop either to a unitarian state or to a partition. That is
why this unique model has determined the unique character of the IFOR/SFOR, which
mission is to maintain the unity of Bosnia. As soon as it withdraws, Bosnia will most
probably dissolve into separate parts.
Baturin concludes that the Bosnian model cannot be used at a broader scale on the
European security level. At the same time it is a matter of primary importance to stick to
the Dayton Accords as they were concluded, without any 'rnodifications", 'Writing offs"
and 'double standards". The challenges to Dayton peace process include the problem of
Posavina corridor, the unilateral prosecution only of the leaders of Republika Srpska, and
uncontrollable return of refugees.
As recent events in Bosnia showed, Russia also wants to be consulted more by
NATO on Bosnian peacekeeping operations. A foreign ministry spokesman said on 12
September, 1997, that Russia demanded "additional coordination" with NATO. For
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example, Russia objected the presence of the US EC-130E aircraft, sent on 1 1 September,
1997 to silence Bosnian Serb broadcasts. 86 .
These views make it quite clear that the Bosnia-like peace operations may be
conducted only under certain conditions.
However, these conditions may be not only a function of certain personalities,
political, economical and military variables. These conditions may and should be first and
foremost the function of national interests, and, particularly, the function of their
interaction and cooperation.
The international commitment to the Bosnian operation is of crucial importance
because it promotes not only national interests but also mutual relations. How Bosnia's
peace is secured will have significant impact not only on the roles of NATO, WEU, EU,
and OSCE, but also U.S.-European relations and NATO's relations with Russia.
SUMMARY
IFOR/SFOR's achievements to date are significant. Once the parties signed the
Dayton accords, the NATO-led implementation force separated the opposing forces,
supervised exchanges of territory, enforced the cease fire, demobilized armies and heavy
weapons and created a secure environment for political and economic recovery. The
stabilization force continues these missions.
86 ST. Planken. Chronology ofKey Events. Part III: SFOR.fAugust 1, 1997 - present). HTTP: //www.
cybercomm.nl/~stp/b_chronology_sfor_b.html
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The military phase of NATO's intervention was spectacularly successful. But the
political phase, enforcing provisions of the Dayton peace accord, has been a dismal failure.
The troops enforced a cease-fire but did little to arrest war criminals or help refugees
return to their homes.
SFOR recently has become more aggressive in enforcing the Dayton accords,
escorting refugees and seizing a few suspects indicted on war crimes charges. However,
these actions risk the possibility that SFOR troops will be drawn into full-scale combat.
How should IFOR/SFOR's achievements be explained? First of all, by the unity of
purpose displayed by the multinational coalition. Secondly, by IFOR/SFOR's robust,
credible military presence, its impartiality, unity of command and use of NATO's tried
procedures. Thirdly, by EFOR/SFOR's realistic mission, to which its military means are
well tailored. Fourthly, it should be noted that IFOR/SFOR's achievements would have
been unthinkable without the dedication and professionalism shown by its commanders
and their troops. Finally, Russian-American cooperation has become one of the critical
factors of the operation's success. It has also shown new prospects and opportunities for
joint military cooperation in the future.
The current conditions in Bosnia still require a substantial military presence with a
primary goal to prevent the partition of Bosnia. The adopted strategy of force shrinking
and reverting to some kind ofUN or OSCE-led peacekeeping operation looks reasonable
and viable. However, it is hardly possible to predict now the longevity of the operation
and the terms of its transition to a traditional peacekeeping mission.
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VI. UNPROFOR AND IFOR/SFOR: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter deals with the major lessons learnt from the management of the
Yugoslav crisis and conflict. The analysis of these lessons, in addition to the previously
analyzed sources, includes also some views of analysts both prior to and after the NATO
intervention to Bosnia. 87 This analysis provides a good basis for comparison of
UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR' s influential factors, which determined the fall and rise of
peacekeepers in that country.
A. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED
1 . The causes of UNPROFORfailure are asfollows.
UNPROFOR tried to respond to cataclysmic unfolding events to which peace
plans had been ad hoc and ineffective responses. In Bosnia, let alone the rest of former
87 Covault, Marvin. Will NATO succeed in Bosnia? CNN. December 13, 1995. HTTP://www.cnn.com
/WORLD/ Bosnia/mission_peace/analysis/9512/12-13/index.html; Johnsen, Wlliam T. Deciphering the
Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks. November 7, 1995; Chris Hedges. NATO Drafts Plan to Extend Its Mission in Bosnia
by Two Years. The New York Times. September 1 1, 1996. P. A 7; Friedman, Thomas L.. Voices of
Experience. The New York Times. December 20, 1995. P. A 21; The UN in Bosnia: A Lesson in Limits.
The New York Times. December 20, 1995. P. A 1; Friedman, Thomas L. Think Haiti. The New York
Times. December 3, 1995. P. A15; Anthony Lewis. Lessons Of Disaster. The New York Times. July 17,
1995. P. A13; William Shawcross. Prescriptions for Peace. The New York Times. February 9, 1997. P.
A24; Eric Schmitt. Pentagon Confident, but Some Serbs 'Will Fight 1 : Military Now Says Bosnia Peace
Plan Will Work. The New York Times. November 27, 1995. P. Al; Adams, James. Bill shouts and swears
and shows his fatal weakness. Sunday Times. May 29, 1994; William Shawcross. Cambodia peacemaker
faces tougher Balkan test. The Times. February 18, 1994.
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Yugoslavia, there were a great number of factions with no identity of interest. At the same
time in Yugoslavia, there was no such unifying, over-arching figure as Prince Sihanouk in
Cambodia, that was a court of last resort to whom all the parties turned.
The new states within the former Yugoslavia were recognized while their
governments were not in control of the territory they claimed. Under this condition the
recognition should have been delayed and concessions to the opposing side encouraged —
or peacekeepers should have been ready to go in and fight for the new regimes.
As it was, UNPROFOR had to 'face the music" of the warring ambitions of Serbs,
Bosnians, Croats, Albanians, Greeks and others, while possessing a limited and impractical
mandate and inadequate resources, and while operating in several countries.
2. There was a general consensus of all powers that active measures must have
been taken to stop hostilities in Bosnia because they jeopardized regional and international
peace and security. Avoiding deeper involvement held greater risks: a wider conflict,
expansion into Central Europe, strains within NATO, tensions in U.S. -Russian relations,
decrease in public support of the Administration and accusations of 'Unprincipled
behavior". That consensus had determined the strong political will and unity of actions as
well as readiness to share risks of intervention.
3. Decision on intervention that involved multinational forces including Russian
contingent was achieved due to a specific combination of national interests in Central
and Eastern Europe. First, Russia had to give up some of its historically formed principles
of special relations with the Serbs. Second, all the regional '^layers" agreed to admit the
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US role as a an honest (or at least as the most honest) broker and counterbalancer in
international disarray bound with polarized political vectors.
4. Due to employment of effective mixed strategy there had formed certain
conditions that provided for the operation's success:
• The appeal of the official Bosnian government for the IFOR deployment;
• The will of warring parties to compromise. By the end of 1995 there had been
clear signs of the increasing war weariness and stalemate. 'Ethnic cleansings" had also
succeeded in redistributing the population in large, more sustainable and continuous
enclaves. This had resulted in a serious cease fire and a peace plan agreed to by all the
combatants. The factions had consented to NATO troops, including Americans and
Russians, to enforce it. President Clinton insisted on letters from Serbian, Bosnian and
Croatian leaders promising to insure the safety of American and other troops.
• The UN and NATO forces had taken sides in the conflict and put pressure on
the stronger party (first the Serbs and then Muslims) to give way. Historical experience
once again proved that neutrality was not required for success, and UN military
operations could most often be successful when they did favor one side in dispute.
5
.
Clear and militarily reasonable conditions were createdfor troop deployment:
• Political leaders gave the military a clear mission statement - a tightly
circumscribed set of goals and achievable tasks to be performed with minimum casualties
in relatively short terms - in a year;
• Sufficient forces were made available;
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• There was a clear military chain of command that did not contain dual key
provision;
• Clear exit strategy was defined (although later revised).
6. Peacekeepers cannot do theirjob if there is no peace to keep. However, urgent
intervention is sometimes necessary at the very height of conflict, if only to keep the
violence from raging out of control. If there is a decision to intei\ ene, it must be well
prepared. To think that peacekeepers can just separate warring factions and not get drawn
into their human problems is an illusion. POs must address the problems underlying the
conflict, otherwise operational success will remain temporary. At the same time, there is a
fragile balance between 'helping them" and 'hot letting them think you are going to solve
all their problems for them". With enough troops and money peacekeepers can make some
difference for the better. But even that limited improvement is easily eroded, or
overwhelmed by the habits of generations, unless some foreign peacekeepers, international
organizations, and aid workers are prepared to stay on the job for a long, long time.
7. Public support is crucialfor a successful intervention. An official commitment
to help enforce a peace settlement is not enough. Prior to intervention in Bosnia the US
top officials acknowledged that the Administration lacked public support to do so. 88
However, NATO was proactive in dealing with this issue. Part of the solution was a
psychologically effective use of radio, TV, and written media to explain NATO's role,
Eric Schmitt. A Tough Sell: Sending GIs to Bosnia. The New York Times. March 10, 1994. P. A12.
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what NATO expected from the populace, what the goals were, etc. This effort was a
considerable contribution to preparing the way for main body forces.
8. It is easier to prevent conflict than to stop it. Early warning measures are
essential to this end. Preventive diplomacy should be employed when ever possible, and
aimed not only at reconciliation or cessation of hostilities. It should also address the deep
roots and causes underlying conflict. Meanwhile, action outside the UN framework to
harmonize national interests and exert certain pressure on conflict parties is crucial to
success. Preemptive UN force deployment is quite viable, like in Macedonia, where it
helped prevent the Balkan wars from spreading.
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNPROFORAND IFOR/SFOR
The overall comparison of factors that influenced UNPROFOR's and IFOR/
SFOR's course is given in Table 3.
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A weak and divided international
response to conflict led to an ambiguous
and contradictory Mandate
Resolute joint efforts of world
community led to a clear Mandate
National interests Political disagreement between the UN
major member states. No will to
compromise on the national interests.
General consensus of all powers that
active measures must be taken. Will to




None. It was more "provocative" than
preventive diplomacy that "pushed the
conflict around" rather than found the
ways for settlement.
Effective mixed strategy was employed
Mission planning Unprepared "cascading" deployments
of UN forces, dual key in the military




mission statement, clear military chain
of command, clear exit strategy,
sufficient forces made available.
Action outside the
UN framework
Was selective and not persistent.
Croatian and Bosnian governments
were pressed hard to stop the Croat-
Muslim fighting in central Bosnia, but
there were never such a pressure on
these parties with regard to the Serbs.
Was overall and persistent. All the
warring factions were brought to
negotiations, pressed hard equally and
made to sign Dayton agree-ments.
Consent of the
parties to conflict
First phase: Peacekeeping force was
deployed to support partial cease-fire.
Initially the UN forces tried to keep
impartiality and neutrality against the
manipulation by all local belligerents.
Second phase: The UN decided to take
sides, however, without a sufficiently
robust force and ROE.
The stronger party was pressed (NATO
air strikes against the Serbs), arid more
robust force with different ROE was
deployed to implement full cessation of
hostilities.
on
oy The problem of sufficient/insufficient forces for peace operations is very complex and conditions-
dependent. Anyway, a well-planned mission normally uses as many troops as needed to keep peace,
otherwise thousands and thousands of troops might be insufficient for an operation lacking sober and







The Mandate and peace plans did not
address the critical problem - who ruled
the Serb communities in Bosnia and
Croatia.
IFOR stepped in when the "ethnic
cleansings" had already brutally solved
the critical problem of power and inter-
entity boundary lines established. The
task of SFOR now is to bring the entities
together.
Local conditions • The dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia.
• The height of the civil war with
strong warring ambitions of the
factions and only partial cease-fires.
• Local consent to the UN's presence
with peace-keeping functions only.
• The will of warring parties to
compromise because of the war
weariness and general stalemate in
the conflict.
• Their readiness to switch over from
the causes of conflict to its outcome
and recognize the status-quo.
• Local consent to NATO troops with
enforcement task and capabilities.
Impartiality and
neutrality
UNPROFOR was expected to be fully
impartial and neutral. However, it had
to take side of the weaker party -
Muslims in Bosnia. At the same time, it
was not so persistent in taking side of
another weaker party - Serbs in Croatia.
IFOR was expected not much as an
impartial, but as a neutral force
authorized to enforce concluded
agreements. This helped deter the FWF
from both attacking each other and
IFOR troops.
Public support It was a full public support of
UNPROFOR although a resentment
about its ability to keep peace and
prevent atrocities was gradually
growing.
Public opinion was extremely agitated
by the images of war in the former
Yugoslavia, fully supported IFOR, and




Past experience shows that if a peacekeeping operation could create conditions of
stability and trust to facilitate eventual settlement it was normally regarded a success.
Another crucial condition for success was the action outside the UN framework that made
a permanent settlement possible when the superpowers, through unilateral means, put
pressure on the stronger party to give way. Neutrality was not required for success.
Moreover, UN military operations were most often successful when they did favor one
side in dispute.
However, this does not mean that these features may be extrapolated to all
situations. The post-Cold War era is characterized by a proliferation of low level intra-
state conflicts. At the same time, it enjoys a number of new advantages. First of all there
is a stronger consensus in the UN that has permitted new tasks and methods in
peacekeeping. The world community should not lose this opportunity that enhances its
capabilities in PO's missions - more explicit and firmly stated mandates beyond the
recognized limitations of peacekeeping as traditionally understood.
We believe that all the hypotheses proposed in front of this thesis may be
considered tested against the case of peace operation in Bosnia and confirmed in general.
However, we also understand that there cannot be a universal solution and not all the
elements of our hypotheses might fit the whole array of conflict situations.
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The peace operations in Bosnia have given several major lessons.
First, a sober calculation of costs and benefits is needed prior to any UN
intervention. It concerns primarily the consensus of national interests, the will ofwarring
parties to seekpeaceful solutions, and the UN member states ' ability to provide sufficient
resources.
Second, the international community should not wait until a conflict 'burns out".
The UN must respond to world emergencies, otherwise it will hav. to be replaced by
something else.
Third, the concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but rigid form of the
traditional prototype should undergo certain changes to adapt to the new conditions.
Peacekeeping operations are only one small part of the overall Peace Operations
Continuum. There needs to be post-conflict peace building to include government
rebuilding, humanitarian assistance, economic restructuring, basic infrastructure rebuilding
and ongoing diplomatic relations to ensure the peace process stays on track, to name only
a few. Peacekeeping is only one part of the entire process, granted a very important one,
that ensures a stable secure environment for the rest of the process to develop.
Figuratively speaking, all peace operations must be a kind of a surgery in the whole
therapy continuum. It must be like the last stroke of a surgeon, but after a good
anesthesia that reduces the painfor a patient - it is very important.
Fourth, it does not seem the best solution to discard the UN peacekeepers and use
only ad hoc regional coalitions with an international mandate. This may lead to a partition
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of the world into zones of influence, and produce a rivalry between regional coalitions
with unpredictable implicationsfor worldpeace and security.
In general, there may be three overlapping echelons of the international
community's response to crises and conflicts:
1. The UN's missions;
2. Regional organizations' missions
3. A unilateral response of a certain state or a group of states.
A graphical representation of this model is given below.
Chart 5. A Three Echelonned Response to Conflict
Conflict
The UN missions/\ Regional organizX^ A certain stateV
) or a group of states'
unilateral responsj
The elements of chart 5 might link together in different combinations depending on
certain conditions.
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Chart 6. A Multilateral Simultaneous Response To Conflict
In this case the UN, regional organizations and separate states might use joint
efforts to settle a conflict.
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Chart 7. Ad hoc Regional Coalitions Response to Conflict
Here, the UN might authorize a mission given to an ad hoc coalition and search for
support of the state or a group of states in the neighborhood of the conflict.
87
Chart 8. A Separate State's (Group of States') Unilateral Response to
Conflict
In this case the UN and regional organizations might authorize and give support to
a separate state or a group of states, normally in the neighborhood of a conflict, to manage
and resolve it.
In general, the international community's way of response is conditions-dependent,
and might start from the relative UN impartiality through regional or even separate state's
partisanship in conflict. The same might be with force strength and ROE: from lightly
armed force with self-defense ROE through more robust force, mandate and ROE. A
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large variety of peace operations might be available: from peacekeeping through peace
enforcement.
As analysis shows, peace enforcement to be initiated with an acceptable degree of
calculated risk, must embrace the following preconditions:
1. Conflict constitutes a real danger to global or regional security, and threatens
vital interests ofregional or globalpowers.
2. It is connected with massive violations ofhuman rights.
3. One or more parties do not want to comply with UN's and regional
organizations ' resolutions.
4. Prior to enforcement a mixed strategy is employed to deter warring parties
from the spreading of hostilities.
5. All parties accept the current Peace Force, and consequently the contribution
to Forcefrom certain countries.
6. War weariness and military stalement of conflict prevail, and make the parties
to searchfor peace solution.
7. Peace enforcement is undertaken with the consent of the government(s) of the
state(s) in which a conflict occurs.
This model is an 'ideal case" that provides necessary requirements for urgent use
of military force, although in practice the decisions may be ruled by other considerations90 .
90 As Lawrence Freedman notes, "In practice, as Bosnia demonstrated, the key questions would revolve
more around the permission of circumstances than their requirements". - Freedman L. Introduction. In:
Military Intervention in European Conflicts. Freedman L. ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, p.2.
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Troops conducting such actions to maintain the order can use arms, for example, against
armed groups.
To achieve a success in conflict settlement all the sides in a conflict situation,
including those influential parties staying outside, should comply at least with following
conditions through all the stages of a conflict:
• An active search for and will to compromise on some principles and national
interests.
• The UN's impartiality and neutrality.
• Diplomatic efforts focus first on attempts to achieve the consent of warring
parties to compromise on some realistic grounds; second, diplomats try to pursuade
parties of possibility to switch over from causes of conflict to its outcome; third, the
consent on peace force deployment is required.
• The use of force, including air strikes, must be limited to the cases in which they
are absolutely necessary, must be proportionate, strong and effective, and correlate with
the other elements of a mixed strategy.
• Warring parties should be notified that if they reject the UN's involvement, they
will have to face regional organization's or even separate states' more robust and less
impartial intervention.
Thus, a working model of international community's conflict management might
be as follows.
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Table 4. A Working Model of Conflict Management
Stages of
crisis/conflict






The UN SC makes an assessment, conducts preventive
diplomacy and authorizes a preventive UN deployment.
Crisis through
war
Low level conflict The UN conducts (authorizes) humanitarian intervention.
Diplomatic efforts are made both by the UN and outside the
UN framework to stop a conflict, negotiate a full cease-fire and
deploy the UN troops to monitor it.
War through
cease-fire
Intense conflict If the UN peacekeeping force is in, a mixed strategy is
employed involving partial use of a regional organization's or
a separate state's (states') military capabilities to make
warring parties to stop hostilities and begin negotiations.
Humanitarian operations are continued. If the UN is still out,
diplomatic efforts are made to negotiate a full cease-fire and
deploy the UN troops to monitor it. The military capabilities of
regional organizations or separate state (states) may be
involved to implement cease-fire agreements. The factors of
war weariness and conflict stalemate are used. If the UN is
denied, humanitarian operations are stopped, and peace
enforcement operation is authorized and conducted by a









If the UN is in, it monitors cease-fires and arbitrates post
conflict peace building. Humanitarian relief is resumed. If the
UN is out, a regional organization or a separate state conducts
all necessary measures to implement agreements. As situation
improves, regional troops gradually turn over their





The UN or political security organization gradually shrinks its
mission to observers through no foreign representatives.
Humanitarian relief also shrinks as local economy starts to
function normally. Conflict is settled.
According to this model the situation in Bosnia now could be assessed as 'a low-
level conflict with a clear threat of back-sliding to war". A robust preventive deployment
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is needed to keep peace, and heavy humanitarian assistance is required to build
confidence. Economic sanctions can only worsen the situation and should be avoided. The
primary emphasis should be on confidence-building measures and prevention of Bosnia's
partition than on efforts to train and equip Bosnian factions.
In retrospect, one of the major lessons is that it was not the best and easiest way
the peace was brought about to the former Yugoslavia. It would have been much better, if
Germany could have compromised on its national interests, and had not recognized
Slovenia and Croatia right after their declarations of independence. Russia could have put
more effective pressure on the Serbs, if there had been an adequate pressure upon the
Croats and Muslims.
Peace operations normally are a definite function of national interests and may be
successful if there is an overlap in national objectives of different 'players". However, they
also may be successful, if there is a mutual desire of the "players", or at least a unilateral
desire of one of the major 'players" to Swallow the principles" for the sake of peace. In
other words, a compromise is always required for peacekeeping success, and the more it is
mutual, the better.
It is a clear exaggeration that Russia has given up its national interests in the
Yugoslav conflict. Russia's participation, from the very beginning of UNPROFOR until
now, has always been very important factor that influenced the situation not only in Bosnia
but also elsewhere in the Balkans. And it was not the interests, but some principles that
were eventually Swallowed". By contributing its troops to IFOR/SFOR Russia has
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managed to secure its traditional ties with the Serbs, and to a certain extent preserved its
influence in the Balkans, as a whole.
However, it was not so easy for the Russian establishment and public opinion to
compromise on the Balkans issues, and there is still a strong belief that then compromise
was more at the account of the Russian than the US interests. This fact should be
considered in the future, while Russia and the US will be working on the issues requiring
mutual concessions.
Close cooperation between the Russian and US politicians and military seems to be
one of the crucial preconditions of success in Bosnia. In any case, Russia's participation in
the peace operations in Bosnia is an important factor and must be continued because it
promotes its national interests, and facilitates Russia-US and Russia-NATO cooperation.
Of course, there is still much to be done to make such a cooperation the rule rather
than the exception. In any case, the POs in Bosnia have demonstrated the international
community's new capabilities in conflict management. The Bosnian experience has once
again proved a banality: problems may be solved if there is a will on both sides to
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